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Introduction 
Efforts to limit property taxes began shortly after the adoption of the modern property tax in the 19th 
century. Fisher (1996) examines the history of the property tax in the United States, and Sjoquist (2008) 
traces the history of the property tax in Georgia. Over the years, policies to limit the growth in property 
tax receipts have included limits on the millage rate, on increases in assessments and on the tax levy. 
Mullins (2003) provides a survey of these policies.1  
In the past 10 years, except for a hiatus during the Great Recession, several states have attempted to 
eliminate, or at least to substantially reduce, property taxes. For example, in 2006, Texas reduced the 
property taxes for schools by one-third, which resulted in a 20 percent reduction in total property tax 
receipts.2 In 2008, the state of Indiana assumed responsibility for the full cost of school operations and 
transportation, child welfare, and other services, resulting in a 38 percent reduction in property tax 
receipts. To finance this increase in state expenditures, Indiana increased its sales tax rate by one 
percentage point. In November 2008, Florida was set to vote on Amendment 5, which would have 
prohibited the state legislature from requiring school districts to levy a property tax. The state was to 
assume responsibility for funding education, with an increase in the sales tax rate being used to generate 
the necessary revenue. A court challenge made its way to the Supreme Court of Florida, which found that 
the proposed amendment was vague and struck down the referendum. In 2008, the Georgia legislature 
considered a proposal (described in Section 2) to replace the school property tax on homesteaded 
properties with a revenue-neutral increase in sales tax revenues. Although the proposal did not pass, it 
came close. More recently, proposals to cut property taxes have been advanced in New Jersey (a 20 
percent cut), New York (a $1.7 billion cut), Pennsylvania (a $3.8 billion cut) and Texas (a $2.5 billion cut).  
We develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a microsimulation model (MSM) to 
analyze the economic and welfare effects of the Georgia proposal, which would have effectively 
eliminated school property taxes on homesteaded properties and replaced the lost revenue with a 
revenue-neutral increase in the state sales tax. A CGE model is a system of equations that are derived 
from maximizing behavior of consumers and firms. The system of equations is solved for the unique 
market equilibrium, where market prices equate quantity demanded and quantity supplied in each and 
every market. An MSM contains detailed information on a large number of households. It consists of a set 
of equations that must satisfy certain adding-up restrictions (i.e., balanced budget constraint, supply 
equals demand, and so on) rather than optimizing behavior, as in a CGE model.  
Several studies have used CGE models to investigate specific aspects (for example, the effect on revenue 
stability or tax incidence) of proposals to replace property taxes with an increase in sales tax revenues. 
For example, DiMasi (1987) and Choi and Sjoquist (2015) explore shifting from a capital property tax to a 
                                                            
1 Also see Haveman and Sexton (2008). 
2 The property tax reduction was financed through a restructuring of the state’s business tax, an increase in the taxes on tobacco 
products, and a surplus in the state budget. 
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land value tax in an urban CGE model. However, we are aware of only three studies that analyze policies 
to reduce property taxes using CGE models that are relevant to the current study: Waters, Holland and 
Weber (1997); Julia-Wise, Cooke and Holland (2002); and Thaiprasert, Faulk and Hicks (2013). These prior 
studies examine the potential effects of a significant reduction in property taxes in Oregon, Idaho and 
Indiana, respectively. In particular, these papers consider Ballot Measure 5, which passed in Oregon in 
1990; Idaho’s proposed One Percent Initiative, which was defeated in 1996; and Indiana’s legislative 
changes to the property tax adopted in 2008. 
The CGE models in Waters, Holland and Weber (1997) and Julia-Wise, Cooke and Holland (2002) are very 
similar to one another. Both models consist of two sectors: a goods sector and a services sector in the 
Waters, Holland and Weber paper, and a tradable goods sector and a non-tradable goods sector in the 
case of Julia-Wise, Cooke and Holland. In both of these models, production uses capital, labor and 
proprietors’ services to produce goods and services according to a Cobb-Douglas production function 
(C.W. Cobb and P.H. Douglas, 1928).3 The quantities of the factors of production are fixed. Both papers 
consider a large decrease in the property tax rate, with the local revenue being replaced by state revenue 
in the case of Oregon. 
These models have several limitations. Some of the technical assumptions in the models impose 
restrictions on demand and supply elasticities that may not be consistent with the actual economy that 
we are attempting to simulate. Housing is combined with other goods and services to form a composite 
good. Thus, there is no separate demand for housing that is dependent on the tax-inclusive price of 
housing. Furthermore, the property tax is modeled as an income tax: property tax revenue equals the 
product of the tax rate and income, and thus, does not depend on the amount of or price of housing.4 By 
treating the property tax in this manner, the model ignores the incentive effects of a change in relative 
prices between housing and all other goods that would result from a reduction in the property tax rate. 
The quantity of capital and labor is assumed to be fixed but mobile across sectors.5 The reduction in 
property taxes reduces government spending on non-educational services, but government services are 
not included in the consumers’ utility functions.  
Thaiprasert, Faulk and Hicks (2013) consider a reduction in property taxes and a revenue-neutral increase 
in the sales taxes. Their CGE model is based on the Washington-Idaho CGE model (Holland, Stodick and 
Devadoss 2004) but is adjusted to allow for more detailed tax analysis and a more detailed housing sector 
than the two papers discussed above. They consider both a short-run scenario in which capital is fixed 
and a long-run scenario in which capital is mobile.  
                                                            
3 A production function is a mathematical model that converts factors of production (e.g., capital and labor) into output  
(e.g., agricultural goods, manufactured goods and so on). A Cobb-Douglas production is a specific function form, y = KaL1-a, 
where y is a good, K is the stock of capital, L is the stock of labor and 0 < a < 1 is a parameter of the function reflecting the 
productivity of the factor in the production of y. Note that if the exponents sum to one, it means that the technology exhibits 
constant returns to scale. 
4 This is not an inherent weakness of CGE modeling because it would be possible to introduce housing as a separate sector with 
its own production technology. However, this approach has rarely been taken.  
5 In our approach, we assume labor is sector- and state-specific, whereas capital is perfectly mobile. 
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Our CGE model, which is a modification of that used in Condon et al. (2015), explores the effects of 
significantly reducing or eliminating Georgia’s income tax and implementing a revenue-neutral increase in 
the state sales tax. We incorporate the results from the CGE model into an MSM to analyze the effects of 
the proposed property tax reform on changes in housing choice (owner vs. renter) and changes in the 
distribution of consumption by income category. We do so by linking the aggregate outputs from the CGE 
model to an MSM using disaggregated data in a “top-down” fashion.6 As discussed in greater detail 
below, there is only a loose connection between the two models. However, this modeling approach (see 
Agénor, Chen and Grimm 2003, Lofgren, Robinson and El-Said 2003, Feltenstein et al. 2014 and the 
references therein) has been used to gain more detailed insight into the distributional consequences of 
policy reforms than is typically provided in a CGE model. 
Our analysis differs from the three papers discussed above in several ways. First, we consider a more 
complex policy in which the property tax on homesteaded property is reduced and currently untaxed 
goods and services are added to the tax base to make the reform revenue neutral. Our model contains 15 
goods and services producing sectors, including currently taxed goods, goods and services that are added 
to the sales tax base, and goods and services that are never taxed.7 Second, our CGE model has a 
dynamic, discrete time structure. Third, our analysis is done in the context of a regional model in which 
trade among Georgia, its five contiguous states, and the rest of the United States (henceforth ROUS) is 
endogenously determined. Additionally, all intermediate and final goods are perfect substitutes, so we do 
not need to estimate cross-price trade elasticities. In other words, we assume that peanuts, electricity or 
automobiles produced in Alabama are identical to the peanuts, electricity or automobiles produced in 
Georgia.  
Finally, we build an MSM to obtain more detailed implications by income class of the aggregate results 
from the CGE model. As previously noted, a CGE model assumes one representative agent or consumer. 
The MSM allows us to increase the number of agents or consumers in the model, say, low-, medium- and 
high-income consumers. Data on the behavior of multiple agents by income category from the MSM 
allow us to conduct a distributional analysis to determine the differential effect of the proposed tax 
reform on low-, medium- and high-income consumers. Because only the tax on homesteaded property is 
reduced, we consider the effect of the reform on housing tenure choice by allowing residents to shift 
between rental and owner-occupied housing within the MSM. We model the property tax as an excise tax 
on the rental value of property.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Next, we describe the Georgia proposal to reduce property 
taxes. Following that is a description of the CGE model, and the fourth section discusses the outcomes of 
that model. The next section presents the MSM and its results. The last section concludes. 
                                                            
6 Our modeling strategy is “top-down” in the sense that we use the CGE model to obtain results assuming a representative 
consumer; then, we use an MSM to obtain results in a more disaggregated fashion. 
7 The choice of 15 sectors is somewhat arbitrary. There is a trade-off between increasing the number of sectors in the model and 
computation feasibility. Consequently, models with 10 to 20 sectors are standard practice in this literature due to limitations on 
computation feasibility. 
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The Georgia Proposal  
The Georgia proposal to eliminate the school property tax on homesteaded property was the third in a 
line of related proposed tax reforms. The first proposal (HR 900) was made at the end of the 2007 session 
of the Georgia General Assembly and called for a change in the current personal income tax (PIT), the 
adoption of a value-added tax, and the elimination of nearly all other state and local taxes including all 
property taxes.  
By late spring, HR 900 was replaced by a new proposal that called for the elimination of all property taxes 
but not the elimination of any other tax. The plan was christened the GREAT Plan for Georgia, which 
stood for “Georgia Repealing Every Ad-valorem Tax.” To replace property tax revenues, the proposal 
called for increasing sales tax revenue by eliminating current sales tax exemptions and taxing services. 
Local governments were promised that the change would be revenue neutral, but the mechanism for 
accomplishing this was not specified in the legislative package. When it appeared that the plan would not 
pass the legislature, the GREAT Plan was replaced by a third proposal.  
The substantive version of the revised GREAT Plan, which we refer to as the GREAT Plan II, contained 
several proposed changes, two of which we focus on in this paper. First, property taxes on homesteaded 
property used to fund K-12 education were to be eliminated by providing a state-funded property tax 
credit to each homeowner equal to the school property tax levy. Second, to finance the credit, sales tax 
revenues were to be increased in two ways: 
 by eliminating the current sales tax exemption for food-for-home consumption with a refundable 
income tax credit equal to food expenses for families with incomes less than 200 percent of the state 
poverty level, and 
 by adding 174 personal services to the sales tax base. The legislation specified 174 NAICS codes to 
indicate which services would be subject to the sales tax. Only the state 4 percent sales tax rate would 
apply to these services, not the various local option sales taxes.  
Although the legislation did not pass, we analyze the GREAT Plan II as an example of a large-scale 
property tax proposal. In the next section, we describe the CGE model that we use to analyze this 
proposal. 
We chose Georgia for our simulated reform, in part, for convenience but also because Georgia 
considered reducing the property tax and recovering the lost revenue by broadening the sales tax base to 
include services. We compared the Georgia proposal to that of five neighboring states, which we chose in 
part for convenience but also because we wanted to consider a diverse set of states. The comparison 
states are the five states bordering Georgia: Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and 
Tennessee. These five comparison states vary in size, with some larger and some smaller than Georgia, 
and have interesting differences in their economic and tax structures. Finally, the six states together 
represent a regional economy.  
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Before explaining the model in detail and discussing the simulation results, we briefly describe the six 
states that are the focus of this study. As reported in Table 1, Florida has the largest economy in terms of 
gross state product (GSP) of the six states at $736.7 billion, which is nearly twice that of Georgia. These six 
states account for 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States. In column two of 
Table 1, we report state and local government expenditures as a share of GSP by state. These shares 
range from 14.1 percent in Georgia to 18.5 percent in North Carolina.  
Column three of Table 1 indicates considerable diversity in the tax structures of these six states. Florida 
raises the most tax revenue as a share of GSP (9.1 percent), and Tennessee raises the smallest share (5.1 
percent). Florida does not have a personal income tax (PIT) and makes up the forgone revenue by 
collecting a larger share of total tax revenue from capital taxes than the other five states. Aside from a 
small tax on capital gains, Tennessee also lacks a PIT, but in contrast to Florida, Tennessee recovers the 
forgone revenue by collecting a larger share of revenue from the sales tax than the other five states.  
Table 1. Size of State Economies and Tax Structures Prior to Proposed Tax Reform  
in Georgia 
REGION 
GROSS STATE 
PRODUCT (GSP) 
(BILLIONS $) 
SHARE IN GSP OF SHARE IN TOTAL TAX REVENUE OF 
STATE AND 
LOCAL 
EXPENDITURES 
(PERCENT) 
STATE AND 
LOCAL TAX 
REVENUE 
(PERCENT) 
CAPITAL 
TAXES 
(PERCENT) 
SALES 
TAXES 
(PERCENT) 
PERSONAL 
INCOME  
TAX 
(PERCENT) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Alabama $169.0 16.5 7.2 41.0 34.9 24.1 
Florida $736.7 14.5 9.1 59.6 40.4 – 
Georgia $390.0 14.1 6.1 53.8 12.1 34.1 
North 
Carolina 
$410.1 18.5 6.6 39.9 22.8 37.2 
South 
Carolina 
$158.3 14.8 6.4 60.3 10.6 29.1 
Tennessee $240.5 16.2 5.1 55.7 42.4 1.9 
Rest of  
the U.S. 
$12,018.1 14.2 8.4 51.8 22.5 25.7 
United 
States 
$14,122.7 16.2 8.3 52.0 23.6 24.4 
In short, there is considerable diversity in the size of these six state economies as well as in the states’ tax 
structures. These differences make it essential to specify the individual structures of Georgia and the 
surrounding states rather than simply treating all states as being economic replicas of one another.  
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The CGE Model 
The Georgia property tax proposals generated a lot of discussion and some analysis, but to date no 
research has focused on the general equilibrium effects of GREAT Plan II, including its incidence and 
distributional effects. Because GREAT Plan II is a major tax reform, it is likely to induce large changes in 
economic behavior across many sectors of the economy. Thus, we estimate these economic effects using 
a CGE model, which can account for the interactions among the various sectors of the economy. In this 
section, we describe the CGE model. Later in the report, we describe the MSM, which produces a more 
detailed distributional analysis. 
Our CGE model is similar to that used in Condon et al. (2015); thus, we only summarize the main features 
of this model. The CGE model considers Georgia, its five border states and the ROUS. The feature that 
most distinguishes our CGE model from that of others is how we model interstate trade. CGE models that 
allow for trade generally incorporate the so-called Armington assumption that goods produced in 
different regions or countries are imperfect substitutes for one another (see Armington 1969). The 
Armington assumption has been widely used in CGE models since its introduction in the ORANI model of 
Australia (see Dixon et al. 1982). Instead, we use a non-Armington approach in which goods traded 
between states are viewed as being identical and thus perfect substitutes in production and 
consumption, which we believe has a number of advantages in a multiregional model of a highly 
integrated common market, like that of the United States. As discussed below, the non-Armington 
approach has several advantages. 
The typical Armington version of a multiregional economy requires all traded good to be imperfect 
substitutes. If they are not, then there will be corner solutions in which regions completely specialize in a 
particular good. For example, Georgia might specialize in producing peanuts, and no other state would 
produce peanuts. An additional technical problem with using Armington trade models for numerical 
analyses is that having sector-specific labor categories greatly increases the dimensionality of the model, 
making the solution more complex. A useful feature of our model is that sectoral wage rates in each 
region are derived from a “backwards solution” in which output prices are determined nationally and 
then taken as given by the individual states in our model. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile. In 
other words, in this model, we assume that capital instantaneously moves to the economic sector and 
state where it receives the highest rate of return. As a result, the rate of return on capital in equilibrium 
must be equal in all economic sectors and in each state, resulting in a national price for capital. The 
sectoral value added in each region is determined from the national prices of the sectoral outputs as well 
as from the intermediate costs derived from the regions’ input-output (IO) matrices. Once both a sector’s 
nominal value added and the national price of capital have been determined, the sector’s wage rate 
(price of labor) is calculated as a residual. Condon et al. (2015) further describes how one can implement 
the non-Armington assumption. 
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We aggregate all commodities into 15 “industries” and assume that all output is produced with a 
combination of intermediate inputs and value added from labor and capital. We follow the common 
practice of describing the structure of intermediate inputs with an input-output (IO) matrix, and we 
therefore assume that intermediate inputs enter the production process in fixed proportions.8 The 15 
industries are agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, housing, manufacturing, trade, transportation, 
financial services, real estate, three services sectors (those services that are currently taxed; those that 
are proposed to be taxed; and those that are never taxed), federal government, and state and local 
government. With regard to labor, we assume that each state has 15 representative agents who allocate 
their labor across the state’s 15 industries. These agents represent the initial workforce in each industry, 
but fractions of each agent can migrate across industries and states between any two periods, taking 
fractions of their labor endowments and assets with them. For example, an agent may have an 
endowment of 100 units of capital or labor. In the pre-reform economy, the agent may allocate all 100 
units of capital or labor to the agricultural sector in Alabama. In the post-reform economy, the agent may 
take a fraction, say one-fourth of his endowment of capital or labor, and allocate it to manufacturing in 
Georgia because of the effect of the proposed tax reform on the returns to capital and labor by sector 
and state. 
During any given period, labor supply is specific to individual industries in individual states so that wages 
differ across industries and states. We permit workers to migrate across states and across industries after 
each period, with the migration depending on the relative wages in the different states and industries. In 
contrast to capital, which we assume is perfectly mobile across economic sectors and states, we assume 
that labor is not perfectly mobile. We assume that transactions costs prevent labor from instantaneously 
migrating or moving to the sector and state with the highest wage rate. We use functions, which we refer 
to as labor migration functions, to account for these transaction costs or frictions that prevent labor from 
instantaneously migrating to the sector and state with the highest wage rate. We use observed changes 
in employment across industries and states to calibrate the labor migration functions; these migration 
functions introduce frictions that prevent instant wage equalization across industries and regions and also 
prevent sudden large movements of labor across states. Because we assume that capital is perfectly 
mobile, there is one national price in equilibrium. In contrast, wage rates can differ among sectors and 
among states because we assume that labor is not perfectly mobile due to the transactions costs or 
frictions from moving from one sector or state to another sector or state. 
                                                            
8 An IO table is a matrix or array of numbers that describes the value of the intermediate goods or materials (electricity, steel, 
plastic and so on) and factors of production (capital and labor) used to produce the final consumption goods in the economy. 
For example, an IO table would include domestic produced grapes and imported grapes. Some of these grapes are intermediate 
goods or materials in the sense that they are used to produce other goods (wine, grape juice and so on). Some of these grapes 
may be exported, and some may be used for final consumption. For each economic sector in the model, the IO table 
summarizes the origin of the commodity (domestic production or imported), the materials used in domestic production of the 
commodity, and the final use of the commodity (i.e., intermediate use, export or final consumption). 
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We model the consumption-saving decision problem of each representative agent in the conventional 
manner.9 All governments make transfers to consumers, invest in government assets (bonds), and 
demand intermediate inputs to produce public goods. They finance these expenditures by levying a 
corporate income tax on the use of capital, property taxes on the use of capital and land, personal income 
taxes on labor and asset income, and sales taxes on the consumption of goods and services, as well as by 
issuing public debt. In our model, public bonds have no risk of default and firms have no risk of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, consumers view the holding of public debt and investment in new capital as 
equivalent. Consequently, the after-tax rates of return to public debt and investment in new capital must 
be equal in equilibrium. Tax rates are average effective tax rates, calculated as actual state and local tax 
revenue for the specific tax in the base year divided by the implied tax base in the base year. We assume 
that all tax rates, other than those affected by the proposed tax reform, remain unchanged over time, 
that government spending on public goods is proportional to each state’s value of production, and that 
government transfers are proportional to each state’s total income.10  
To model the tax policy change, we assume that the property tax on capital and land used in producing 
homesteaded housing services is reduced by one-half because property taxes for education are about 
half of all property taxes. Lost property tax revenue is partially replaced by expanding the sales tax base 
to include personal services and food-for-home consumption, which are currently exempt from the state 
sales tax. However, because the revenue gained from the expansion of the sales tax base may differ from 
the amount needed to reduce property taxes for homesteaders, we also allow the state sales tax rate to 
adjust to maintain a balanced budget.  
The data for the CGE model are for the year 2009.11 Other data are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Government Finances webpage12 and the national and regional webpages13 of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). The data and behavioral assumptions in the model reflect annual values. Thus, we 
                                                            
9 See, for example, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985). More specifically, we model the consumption-savings decision with a 
standard set of nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas utility functions. We assume that each 
representative agent chooses an aggregate consumption time path that maximizes a CES lifetime utility function. The agent’s 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is derived as part of the calibration exercise. The agent then decides, based on a Cobb-
Douglas utility function, how to divide the total consumption of goods among the output from the 15 industries. Each consumer 
demands bonds as an instrument for intertemporal optimization via consumption smoothing. Our specification of the dynamics 
of capital formation corresponds to the standard macroeconomic formulation of forward-looking representative agents who 
optimize over time. We determine the rates of time preferences numerically as part of the solution algorithm so that a family’s 
long-run saving rate converges to a stable value, given the family’s observed ratio of marginal utility to the price index in period 
zero. The algorithm is described in detail in Tideman et al. (2002). The advantage of this approach is that the periods can be 
solved sequentially while maintaining the assumption of perfect foresight, which makes it possible to solve the model for a 
larger number of periods. 
10 We permit the United States to run a trade deficit with the rest of the world and assume that the rest of the world supplies  
any quantity of import demand at the prices that prevail in the United States. Consumers finance their demand for imports  
by selling fractions of their capital stock and of their holdings of government debt to foreigners. Foreigners use their asset 
revenue and the proceeds from net exports to finance the governments’ budget deficits and to invest in new capital in the 
United States.  
11 The input-output matrices are obtained from IMPLAN, which is a company specializing in producing region IO tables. The 
regional IO matrices are described in IMPLAN (2009).  
12 See www.census.gov/govs/financegen.  
13 See www.bea.gov.  
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interpret a period to be equivalent to a year, which is the time required to produce a year’s worth of 
output. As noted above, we follow the standard practice of measuring tax rates as the ratio of tax 
revenue to the tax base. BEA and IMPLAN data are used to calculate some of the model’s parameters. 
Other parameters, for example the elasticity of substitution between consumption of goods and leisure, 
are derived from calibrating the model to historical data. However, we require that these elasticities be 
consistent with the range of values available in the literature. A data file is available from the authors 
upon request. 
Results from the CGE Model 
This section begins by describing the baseline simulation and GREAT PLAN II in terms of the trends in four 
key macroeconomic aggregates — real personal income, real consumption of goods and services, real 
labor supply and real demand for capital — for the six states in the model and the ROUS. We decompose 
the key features of the GREAT Plan II into two reforms, which we refer to as options A and B. 
We begin by briefly describing the baseline simulation that we use as a benchmark to gauge the effect of 
Georgia’s tax reforms on its economy, on the economies of each of the five comparison states and on the 
economy of the ROUS. Recall that the model is calibrated to a single year. Hence, the baseline simulation 
is used for purposes of comparison and should not be interpreted as a statistical forecast of future 
performance, which it obviously is not. 
BASELINE SIMULATION 
Table 2 reports the results of the baseline simulation. We report the results for 11 periods because the 
changes in period-to-period growth rates for additional periods are small. We index each endogenous 
variable by setting it equal to 100 in the base year, which is reported in the column labeled zero. Thus, 
the percentage growth rate relative to the base year is easily interpreted from the numbers in Table 2. 
Using the growth rate in real personal income as a measure of economic performance, it is evident in 
Table 2 that Georgia’s economy outperforms the other states and the ROUS over the 11 periods in the 
baseline simulation, with the exception of North Carolina. Real personal income in Georgia increases by 
about 34 percent over the 11 periods, which is equivalent to an average annual compound growth rate 
(henceforth, simply the compound growth rate) of about 3.0 percent. This is approximately equal to 
Georgia’s average annual compound growth rate in personal income over the 1990-2008 period, which 
was 3.9 percent.  
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Table 2. Baseline Simulation of Key Macroeconomic Variables by Region and  
by Period 
STATE 
PERIOD COMPOUND 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH 
RATE* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Real Personal Income             
Alabama 100 98 9 101 103 106 108 112 116 121 126 2.34% 
Florida 100   99 101  103  105  108  111 114  118  122  127  2.45% 
Georgia 100  98  100  102  104  108  111  116   121  127  134  2.99% 
North Carolina 100  99  101  10  106  110  114  119   124  131  138  3.26% 
South Carolina 100  98  99  10  103  106  109  113   118  123  129  2.57% 
Tennessee 100  98  99  101  103  106  109  113   117  122  128  2.47% 
Rest of U.S. 100  99  100  102  105  108  111  115   120  125  132  2.80% 
United States 100  99  100  102  105  108  111  115   120  125  132  2.78% 
Real Consumption of Goods            
Alabama 100   97   97   97   97  98  99  101   102  104  105  0.52% 
Florida 100   98  98  99  100  102  103  105   107  109  111  1.06% 
Georgia 100   97   97  98 99  100  102  104   106  108  110  0.96% 
North Carolina 100   98  98  98  99  101  102  104   106  108  110  0.98% 
South Carolina 100   97   96   97   97  98 99  100   102  103  105  0.46% 
Tennessee 100   97   97   97  98  100  102  104   106  109 111  1.05% 
Rest of U.S. 100   98  99  99  100  101  101  103   103  104  105  0.53% 
United States 100   98  99  99  100  101  102  103   104  105  106  0.60% 
Real Labor Supply             
Alabama 100  97  96  95  94  92  91  90   89   88   88  -1.30% 
Florida 100  99  99  98  97  96  95  94   93   92   92  -0.86% 
Georgia 100  98  98  97  97  96  96  96   95   95   96  -0.46% 
North Carolina 100  98  96  95  94  93  93  92   91   91   91  -0.98% 
South Carolina 100  98  97  96  94  93  92  91   91   90   90  -1.09% 
Tennessee 100  98  96  95  94  93  91  90   89   88   88  -1.32% 
Rest of U.S. 100  98  96  95  94  93  92  92   91   91   90  -1.01% 
United States 100  98 97  96  94  93  93  92   91   91   91  -0.99% 
Real Demand for Capital             
Alabama 100  100 102  104  107  110  113  117   121  126  133  2.85% 
Florida 100  101  103  106  109  112  116  121   126  133  140  3.40% 
Georgia 100  99  102  105  109  113  118  123   130  137  145  3.82% 
North Carolina 100  100  10  105  109  112  117  122   127  134  142  3.56% 
South Carolina 100  99  101  104  107  111  115  120   12  132  123  2.07% 
Tennessee 100  100  102  105  108  111  115  119   124  129  136  3.11% 
Rest of U.S. 100  100  102  104  107  110  114  118   123  129  136  3.09% 
United States 100  100  102  104  107  110  114  118  123  129  136  3.13% 
*Growth rates were calculated using non-rounded values of the macro variables. 
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It is difficult to determine how well the model represents the true dynamics of the states analyzed. The 
simulation is forward looking and out of sample, so it cannot be taken to directly represent any historical 
time period. In addition, the model is calibrated to a single year, as it is not possible to replicate dynamic 
paths for all states simultaneously. In reality, policy parameters change from year to year, so any 
simulation in which we assume that these parameters remain constant cannot hope to perfectly replicate 
historical dynamic paths. In fact, such difficulties would remain even in a model for a single region, state 
or country. In general, attempts to replicate the dynamic path of a macro-economy can only approximate 
the actual economy, requiring subjective judgment as to whether the model is a “good” replica of the 
actual economy being modeled.  
Real consumption of goods and services increases modestly over the 11 time periods in all six states, 
including the ROUS. Alabama and South Carolina experience the smallest increases in real consumption in 
the six-state region. In terms of the growth rate in the real demand for capital, Georgia and North 
Carolina lead the other states in the region and the ROUS over the 11 periods of the baseline simulation. 
Finally, real labor supply is decreasing in all six states and the ROUS over the 11-period time horizon. 
Georgia has the smallest decrease (in absolute value) in real labor supply, with Florida coming in a distant 
second. The remaining states have negative compound growth rates of labor supply between -0.98 to       
-1.32 percent, as compared to -0.46 and -0.86 in Georgia and Florida, respectively. 
OPTION A 
This section examines the effect of option A on the same set of macroeconomic variables used in the 
baseline simulation. Option A consists of adding personal services and food-for-home consumption to 
Georgia’s sales tax base and instituting a revenue-neutral decrease in the property tax rate on owner-
occupied housing. Table 3 reports the simulation results. 
As a result of this reform, the compound growth rate of real personal income in Georgia decreases from 
2.99 percent in the baseline simulation to 2.85 percent in the simulation of option A. This decline in the 
growth rate in real personal income in Georgia suggests that the proposed reform is more distortionary 
than the baseline tax system. This finding illustrates the importance of careful and detailed modeling of 
tax reform proposals.14 Furthermore, the simulation of option A shows that the decline in the growth rate 
in real personal income in Georgia ripples through the regional economy, decreasing the growth rates in 
real personal income in the other five states as well.  
                                                            
14 See, for example, Zodrow (2001) and the references therein for an insightful discussion of the various theories of the incidence 
of a local property tax. Briefly, Zodrow and his frequent coauthor Mieszkowski contend that from the perspective of a single 
taxing jurisdiction, the property tax is largely borne by the local owners of labor and land in the taxing jurisdiction. However, the 
distortions depend on the property tax rate in the jurisdiction relative to the nationwide average property tax rate. 
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Table 3. Key Macroeconomic Variables by Region and by Period for Option A 
STATE 
PERIOD COMPOUND 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH 
RATE* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Real Personal Income             
Alabama 114  111  112  113  115  118  121 125   130  135  142  2.18% 
Florida 111  109  110  112  115  117  121  124   129  134  140  2.37% 
Georgia 117  115  115  117  120  123  128  133  139  147  155  2.85% 
North Carolina 117  114  115  117  120  123  128  133   139  146  154  2.80% 
South Carolina 115  112  112  114  116  119  122  127   132  138  145  2.35% 
Tennessee 116  112  112  114  116  119  122  126   131  136  143  2.12% 
Rest of U.S. 115  112  113  114  117  120  124  128   134  140  148  2.56% 
United States 115  112  113  114  117  120  124  128   134  140  148  2.55% 
Real Consumption of Goods            
Alabama 104   99   96   95   94   94   94   95   95   96   97  -0.71% 
Florida 102   97   96   95   95   95  96  97   97   98   99  -0.29% 
Georgia 106  101   99   98   98   98   98  99  100  102  103 -0.29% 
North Carolina 104   99   98   97   97  97  98  99   100  101  103  -0.09% 
South Carolina 104   99   97   96   95   95   95  96   96   97   97  -0.68% 
Tennessee 106  100   98   97   97   97   98   99   100  101  103  -0.30% 
Rest of U.S. 104   100   98   97   96  96   95   95   95   95   95  -0.97% 
United States 104   99   98   97   96  96   96  96   96   96   96  -0.86% 
Real Labor Supply             
Alabama 87  86  85  85  84  83  82  82   8`   80   80  -0.83% 
Florida 90  90  91  91  91  90  89  89   88   87   87  -0.27% 
Georgia 87  87   87  87  87  87  87  87   87   87   88  0.11% 
North Carolina 86  84  84  83  82  82  81  81   80   80   80  -0.71% 
South Carolina 87  85  85  84  84  83  82  82   81   81   81  -0.66% 
Tennessee 89  87  86  86  85  84  83  82   81   8`   80  -0.98% 
Rest of U.S. 88  87  86  85  85  84  84  84   83   83   84  -0.55% 
United States 88  87  86  86  85  84  84   84   83   83   84  -0.53% 
Real Demand for Capital             
Alabama 98  97  98  99  101  104  107  110   114  119  125  2.48% 
Florida 101  101  104  107  110  112  115  118   122  127  133  2.83% 
Georgia 97  96  98  101  104  108  113  118  124  131  140  3.66% 
North Carolina 96  95  97  98  101  103  107  111   116  121  128  2.96% 
South Carolina 100  97  99  102  105  109  114  119   124  131  121  1.85% 
Tennessee 107  106  108  110  113  116  120  124   129  134  141  2.77% 
Rest of U.S. 100  99  99  101  103  105  109  1123   118  123  130  2.64% 
United States 100  99  100  101  103  106  109  113  118  124  130  2.68% 
*Growth rates were calculated using non-rounded values of the macro variables. 
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Turning now to the effect of the reform on real labor supply, option A causes the decline in real labor 
supply in the baseline simulation for Georgia to turn positive. More specifically, the compound growth 
rate in real labor supply changes from -0.46 percent in the baseline to 0.11 percent under option A. 
Neighboring states also experience increased growth rates in real labor supply, but the changes in 
percentage terms are significantly smaller than in Georgia, ranging from a 26 percent increase in the 
negative compound growth rate in Tennessee to a 69 percent increase in Florida.  
In contrast, Georgia sees a 4 percent decrease in the compound growth rate in the real demand for 
capital, which is accompanied by substantially larger decreases in the compound growth rates in the real 
demand for capital in the neighboring states, ranging from about -11 percent in Tennessee to -17 percent 
in Florida. In the baseline, the real demand for capital is increasing over the 11-period time horizon in all 
six state economies. Georgia’s proposed tax reform appears to slow this trend throughout the regional 
economy by decreasing (in absolute value) the negative growth rate in real labor supply and 
simultaneously decreasing the growth rate in real demand for capital. For example, the compound 
growth rate of real labor supply (real demand for capital) in the baseline (Table 2) for Alabama is -1.3 
percent (2.9 percent). In contrast, the compound growth of real labor supply (real demand for capital) 
under option A (Table 3) for Alabama is -0.8 percent (2.5 percent). 
Using real consumption of goods as a measure for the welfare effects of the reform, the adoption of 
option A causes the modest growth in real consumption throughout the six-state regional economy in the 
baseline simulation to become negative. More specifically, real consumption in Georgia decreases from 
110 in period 10 of the baseline simulation to 103 in the corresponding period in the option A simulation. 
As a result, the compound growth rate in real consumption in Georgia decreases from a modest 0.96 
percent in the baseline to -0.29 percent in the post-reform economy. Thus, option A creates a substantial 
reversal of fortune in Georgia. The other five states experience similar reversals, with modest growth in 
real consumption in the baseline becoming negative as the result of option A. 
In sum, the proposed reform has a substantial negative effect in percentage terms on Georgia’s economy. 
Furthermore, the adverse economic consequences of the reform are not isolated to Georgia; rather, they 
spread throughout the regional economy. We provide a more disaggregated analysis of the distributional 
consequences of GREAT Plan II when we discuss the results of the MSM. 
OPTION B 
We next examine the economic effects of Georgia adopting option B, which consists of a further 
expansion of the sales tax base and an increase in the sales tax rate sufficient to eliminate school property 
taxes on owner-occupied housing. Table 4 shows the results of this simulation. 
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Table 4. Key Macroeconomic Variables by State and by Period for Option B 
STATE 
PERIOD COMPOUND 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH 
RATE* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Real Personal Income             
Alabama 114  111  112  113  115  118  121  125  130  135  142  2.17% 
Florida 111  109  110  112  115  117  121  124  129  134  140  2.37% 
Georgia 117  115  115  117  120  123  128  133  139  146  155  2.81% 
North Carolina 117  114  115  117  120  124  128  138  139  146  154  2.79% 
South Carolina 115  112  112  114  116  119  122  127  132  138  145  2.34% 
Tennessee 116  112  112  114  116  119  122  126  131  136  142  2.10% 
Rest of U.S. 115  112  113  114  117  120  124  128  134  140  148  2.55% 
United States 115  112  113  114  117  120  124  128  134  140  148  2.54% 
Real Consumption of Goods            
Alabama 104    99    96    95    94    94    94    95    95    96   97  -0.72% 
Florida 102   97    96    95    95    95   96    97    97    98    99  -0.31% 
Georgia  106  101    99    98    98    98    98    99  100  102  103  -0.31% 
North Carolina 104    99    98    97    97    97   98    99  100  101  103  -0.11% 
South Carolina 104    99    97    96    96    95    95    96    96    97    98  -0.70% 
Tennessee 106  100    98    97    97    97    98    99  100  101  103  -0.32% 
Rest of U.S. 104    99    98   97    97    96    95    95    95    95    95  -0.99% 
United States 104    99    97    97    96    96    96    96    96    96    95  -0.88% 
Real Labor Supply             
Alabama   87    86   85    85    84    83    82    82   81    80    80  -0.84% 
Florida   90   90    91    92    91    90    90    89    88    87    87  -0.27% 
Georgia   87    87    87    87    87    90    87    87    87    87    88  0.07% 
North Carolina   86    84   84    83    82    82    81    81    80    80    80  -0.73% 
South Carolina   87    85    85    84    84    83    82    82    81    81    81  -0.67% 
Tennessee   89    87    86    86    85    84    83   82    81    81    80  -0.99% 
Rest of U.S.   88    87   86    85    85    84    84    83    83    83    83  -0.56% 
United States   88    87    86    85    85    84    84    84    83    83    83  -0.55% 
Real Demand for Capital             
Alabama   98    97    98    99  10  104  107  110  115  119  125  2.48% 
Florida 101  101  104  107  110  112  115  118  122  127  133  2.82% 
Georgia   97    96    98  101  104  108  113  118  124 131  139  3.62% 
North Carolina   96    95    97    98  101  103  107  111  116  121  128  2.95% 
South Carolina 101    97    99  102  105  109  114  119  124  131  121  1.83% 
Tennessee 107  106  108  110  113  116  120  124  129  134  140  2.76% 
Rest of U.S. 100    99    99  101  103  105  109  113  118  123  130  2.63% 
United States 100    99  100  101  103  106  109  113  118  124  130  2.67% 
*Growth rates were calculated using non-rounded values of the macro variables. 
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As one might expect, the incremental effect of option B relative to option A is very small, generally on the 
order of -0.1 or -0.2 percentage points. The change for Georgia in the compound growth rates for real 
personal income in period 10 between the two reforms is only -0.6 percentage points. The differences in 
real personal income in period 10 between the two reforms in the remaining states are even smaller, 
ranging from -0.1 percentage points in Florida to -0.3 percentages points in North Carolina. The economic 
effects of option B relative to option A are also very small — so small, in fact, that we can treat the two 
reforms as essentially the same in economic terms and have no need to distinguish between them.  
Thus far, our main findings are as follows. First, there are only very small differences in the 
macroeconomic aggregates between options A and B. Second, both options have relatively large effects 
in percentage terms on the macroeconomic aggregates relative to the baseline. Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the simulations indicate that the two reforms have largely deleterious effects on the two 
macroeconomic aggregates that are most likely to have the greatest effect on individual well-being: the 
growth rates of real personal income and of real consumption of goods. 
The CGE model is complex and thus explaining its results is difficult. But, here is some explanation. The 
policies we simulate involve a decrease in the property tax rate on housing and an increase in sales taxes, 
such that there is no change in total tax revenue. Because housing is capital intensive relative to other 
industries, the effect of the policy is equivalent to a policy that reduces the tax on capital in the housing 
sector and increases the tax on commodities in the other sectors. We consider the effects in three stages. 
First, we consider the case of just Georgia. Second, we change the context to allow interstate mobility of 
capital and labor. Third, we allow for dynamic effects and thus allow for growth in the capital stock. 
In a static, closed economy the tax reduction will increase the demand for capital and labor in housing 
while the increased tax on the non-housing sector will reduce the demand for capital and labor. Because 
of the difference in the relative capital intensity, the effect of the tax policy will also increase the rental-
wage ratio and shift capital and labor from the non-housing sector to the housing sector.  
Now, consider what happens if we allow for interstate mobility. Given the increase in the rental-wage 
ratio, capital will flow into the state and labor will leave. This will have the effect of increasing the capital-
labor ratio in the state and reducing the rental-wage ratio relative to the closed economy equilibrium. 
However, relative to the pre-tax policy equilibrium, the rental-wage ratio and the capital-labor ratio in the 
housing sector will be larger. The result of these effects could be a large decrease in the quantity of 
consumption goods and a small increase in the quantity of housing. Our results suggest that such a 
change will reduce the welfare of consumers, that is, they would have preferred the original tax structure, 
with less housing and more consumer goods.  
If we now allow our static, open economy model to become dynamic, the results become increasingly 
difficult to evaluate analytically. Recall that our model assumes that investors make decisions regarding 
domestic investment based upon current interest rates and future rates of returns to capital. As returns 
to capital change, based upon perfectly mobile capital flows between states as well as labor migration, so 
will rates of investment and rates of growth change. Additionally, we are replacing a lowered capital tax in 
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the capital intensive housing sector with a consumption tax in the relatively labor intensive part of the 
economy. Thus, we are reducing one tax distortion while increasing another. We do not know in advance 
which tax change will have a greater positive (or negative) impact on rates of capital formation, and 
hence upon income growth. 
The Microsimulation Model 
To explore the distributional effects of GREAT Plan II, we construct an MSM for the Georgia economy. We 
link the MSM in a top-down fashion to the aggregate results from the CGE model. Because the economic 
consequences of options A and B are so similar, we use the MSM to model the distributional effects of 
option B relative to the baseline. We choose option B for this simulation because it incorporates all of the 
reforms included in option A as well as some further reforms, making it the more comprehensive of the 
two reforms. 
As explained in greater detail below, to establish a connection between the CGE model and the 
information available in micro databases we use a top-down approach from the CGE model to the MSM 
using representative household groups (RHG).15 In this approach, a traditional CGE model with 
representative households is used to simulate a policy reform, producing changes in key macroeconomic 
variables (consumption, income, prices, aggregate consumption by commodity group or sector, etc.). 
Second, a dataset consisting of detailed household information from a sample of Georgia residents is 
used to construct representative households for each income category in the MSM. In our case, we 
construct 10 income deciles, which is the usual practice. Finally, the changes estimated by the CGE model 
are imposed on each representative household for the 10 income deciles. 
The advantage of this approach is its simplicity. As mentioned by Lofgren, Robinson and El-Said (2003), 
the top-down RHG approach requires fewer resources in terms of data, time and skill compared to 
alternative approaches that are not based on RHG.16 The top-down approach has three disadvantages. 
First, we assume a representative agent for each of the income deciles. As a result, we do not capture the 
full richness of real consumers in each decile, who have different tastes for goods and services and 
different endowments of capital and labor. Second, we strive to make the consumption of final goods and 
services in the MSM add up to the aggregate total of final goods and services for each commodity group. 
However, the two models are not entirely consistent with one another. Third, the fact that demand for 
final goods and services in the MSM does not equal the supply of final goods and services for each 
commodity group in the CGE should lead to feedback effects in the CGE model. For example, suppose 
that the demand for manufactured goods in the MSM exceeds the supply of manufactured goods in the 
CGE model. The excess demand for manufactured goods should cause the market price of manufactured 
goods in the CGE to increase, which would increase the quantity of manufactured goods supplied and 
                                                            
15 See Feltenstein et al. (2014) for a more extensive discussion of linking MSMs to CGE models. Agénor et al. (2003) also describe 
a top-down RHG procedure. 
16 Some prior studies have employed a bottom-up RHG approach. This approach is also described in Feltenstein et al. (2014).  
18 
cslf.gsu.edu The Impact of Interstate Mobility on the Effectiveness of Property Tax Reduction in Georgia 
decrease the quantity of manufactured goods demanded. Furthermore, the change in the price of 
manufactured goods relative to the prices of all other goods in the economy should affect demand and 
quantity supplied for these other goods. However, the CGE model does not take these feedback or 
general equilibrium effects into account. 
For the MSM, we use data from the 2011 American Community Survey’s Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS) to form 10 income groups with an equal number of households.17 Then, we construct a 
representative household for each of the income deciles using mean values of the major attributes of the 
households in a given income group. For each income decile, we use U.S. Census Bureau data to calculate 
income by source, housing value, rent paid and employment by industry. We specify the share of 
households within each income decile that are homeowners and renters. We use Census data to estimate 
the share of income coming from the three sources modeled in the CGE: labor income, capital income 
and government transfers. We calculate the percentage of individuals within each income decile who are 
employed in each of the 15 industry sectors. We assume that the wage rate in each industry is equal to 
one, and we further assume that a unit of labor is equally productive in each sector of the economy. We 
assume that the labor supply of any worker is fixed, i.e., we do not allow for a labor-leisure choice. From 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), we calculate expenditures by service 
and product for the representative household in each of the 10 income deciles.  
The CGE model produces aggregate labor income, aggregate capital and aggregate government transfer 
income in the baseline and in the counterfactual economy, which assumes Georgia has adopted option B. 
In the baseline simulation (Table 2), labor income in Georgia is increasing as a share of total personal 
income over the 11 time periods in the model from approximately 35 percent in period zero to about 42 
percent in period 10. In contrast, capital income is decreasing as a share of personal income over the 
same period, from about 37 percent to approximately 30 percent in periods zero and 10, respectively. In 
our model, personal income consists of wage income, capital income and government transfers less 
indirect business taxes (i.e., sales taxes, import duties, special excise taxes and property taxes). The share 
of government transfers in total personal income trends upward slightly by about two percentage points 
over this period. Interestingly, there is a sharp reduction in the share of personal income from capital and 
a more or less offsetting increase in the share of transfer income under option B. The share of labor 
income in personal income under option B trends slowly upward by about two percentage points. 
We use data from the Census to estimate the shares of total labor, capital and transfer income received 
by each income class. Table 5 reports these shares. In a necessary abstraction from reality, we assume 
that these shares stay the same in both the baseline and counterfactual simulations.  
  
                                                            
17 PUMS files are a set of untabulated records about individual people or housing units. The U.S. Census Bureau produces the 
PUMS files so that data users can create custom tables that are not available through pretabulated (or summary) ACS data 
products. The following website provides further information about PUMS data: census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-
documentation/pums.html. 
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Table 5. Wage, Transfer, and Capital Income Shares by Income Class 
INCOME 
CLASS 
SHARE OF THE TOTAL WAGE 
BILL BY INCOME CLASS 
(PERCENT) 
SHARE OF TOTAL TRANSFER 
INCOME BY INCOME CLASS 
(PERCENT) 
SHARE OF TOTAL CAPITAL 
INCOME BY INCOME CLASS 
(PERCENT) 
1 0.4 3.2 0.4 
2 1.3 7.8 1.5 
3 2.7 8.5 2.4 
4 4.3 9.0 3.5 
5 5.9 10.3 4.4 
6 7.9 10.7 5.4 
7 10.3 11.3 6.8 
8 13.5 11.8 8.9 
9 18.8 12.0 11.5 
10 34.9 15.5 55.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
The CGE model also specifies relative prices for each industry group in both the baseline and the 
counterfactual simulations. Option B causes relative prices to change, which results in changes to 
aggregate demand and supply for each of the 15 industry groups in the CGE model. We use the transition 
matrix from Fullerton and Rogers (1993) to transform output by industry from the CGE model to goods 
and services for the MSM. We use data on aggregate personal income and consumption to calculate an 
average propensity to consume (APC), which is the ratio of total consumption divided by personal income 
by period for Georgia in the baseline and in the counterfactual simulations. Although the APC for Georgia 
changes in the two simulated economies, in a second abstraction, we assume that the APC is the same for 
each income class in the MSM. Finally, we use data from the CES to calculate expenditure shares by 
income class for each of the 15 commodity groups in the CGE model. Then, we use the transition matrix 
from Fullerton and Rogers (1993) to transform output by industry from the CGE model to final 
consumption goods and services for the MSM. 
Reducing property taxes on owner-occupied housing changes the relative prices for owning versus 
renting. To measure the effect of this change on tenure decision, we use an elasticity estimate from 
Rosen and Rosen (1980).18 Rosen and Rosen estimate the elasticity of housing tenure with respect to the 
relative price of owning versus renting. We adjust their estimate to account for the difference between 
how we and they measure housing prices. 
                                                            
18 The cross-price elasticity of housing tenure choice describes the percentage change in the demand for owner-occupied 
housing for a percentage change in the price of rental housing. Suppose, for example, that this elasticity is equal to 0.5. Then, a 
10 percent increase in the price of rental housing would result in a 5 percent (= 10 × 0.5) increase in the demand for owner-
occupied housing.   
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Using the expenditure and income shares for each decile, we use aggregate expenditures and income 
from the CGE model for the baseline and counterfactual simulations to estimate total consumption for 
the representative household in each decile in both simulations. In sum, aggregate personal income and 
aggregate consumption of final goods and services by commodity group produced by the CGE model in 
the baseline and counterfactual simulations serve as adding-up constraints in the MSM. In other words, 
suppose aggregate personal income (aggregate consumption) in the baseline simulation of Georgia from 
the CGE model is equal to 100; then, aggregate personal income (aggregate consumption) in the MSM 
should equal 100, as should the counterfactual simulation. 
Results from the Microsimulation Model 
As previously discussed, options A and B result in the real consumption of goods and services in period 
10, decreasing by about a 6 percent relative to the baseline estimate. Because utility is monotonic in 
consumption and the differences in Cobb-Douglas exponents by income class are relatively small, we 
believe that discussing the distributional consequences of GREAT PLAN II in terms of consumption rather 
than utility is more straightforward than the alternative. We use the MSM to construct consumption 
shares by income decile to provide a more detailed picture of the distributional consequences of GREAT 
Plan II. Because options A and B are so similar, we focus on the distributional consequences of option B. 
Table 6 presents the consumption shares by income deciles and for periods zero, five and 10 in the 
baseline and counterfactual simulations.  
The left panel of Table 6, labeled baseline, shows that income class 10 is responsible for a much larger 
share of aggregate consumption than the other income classes. For example, the sum of the consumption 
shares of income classes one through seven is approximately 37.3 percent, which is essentially equal to 
the consumption share of income class 10 alone. The data in Table 6 also indicates that the consumption 
shares of the income classes in the baseline simulation are fairly stable over time.  
Turning now to the counterfactual simulation, we see that GREAT Plan II has virtually no effect on the 
consumption shares by income class. For example, the consumption of income class one in period 10 
under option B is approximately 0.8 percent greater than the consumption share of the corresponding 
income class and period in the baseline simulation. In fact, the consumption shares of income classes one 
through nine are slightly greater in period 10 under option B compared to the corresponding period in 
the baseline. In contrast, the consumption share of income class 10 in period 10 is slightly smaller in 
option B compared to that in the baseline. For all practical purposes, GREAT Plan II has no effect on the 
distribution of consumption by income class, but the reform does have a substantial negative impact on 
the growth rates in real personal income and real consumption of goods and services.  
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Table 6. The Effect of GREAT Plan II on the Share of Total Consumption by Income 
Class and by Period 
  BASELINE OPTION B 
INCOME CLASS PERIOD 
  0 5 10 0 5 10 
1 1.16 1.15 1.13 1.27 1.20 1.14 
2 3.15 3.11 3.05 3.39 3.23 3.07 
3 4.17 4.15 4.13 4.42 4.28 4.15 
4 5.28 5.28 5.28 5.51 5.41 5.30 
5 6.54 6.57 6.59 6.80 6.71 6.62 
6 7.71 7.79 7.86 7.96 7.94 7.89 
7 9.26 9.38 9.49 9.49 9.52 9.53 
8 11.32 11.50 11.66 11.51 11.62 11.70 
9 14.21 14.51 14.79 14.35 14.62 14.85 
10 37.20 36.57 36.04 35.31 35.46 35.75 
Summary and Conclusions 
Over the past decade, there have been calls in several states to significantly reduce property taxes. In 
Georgia, a proposal was advanced that if enacted would have eliminated property taxes on homesteaded 
property for school purposes, with the lost revenue being replaced with an expansion of the sales tax 
base to include services and some products that are currently exempt. We analyze the economic effects 
of this proposal using a CGE model. We then take the results from the CGE model and use them in an 
MSM to explore the effects of the proposal in more detail. 
We consider two proposals. The first proposal consists of adding services to Georgia’s sales tax base and a 
revenue-neutral decrease in the property tax rate on owner-occupied housing. The second proposal 
further expands the sales tax base and increases the sales tax rate by an amount sufficient to eliminate 
school property taxes on homesteaded property. We find little difference in the outcomes of the two 
proposals. The proposed reforms, if enacted, would have a substantial negative effect in percentage 
terms on Georgia’s economy. Furthermore, the adverse economic consequences of the reforms are not 
isolated to Georgia but rather spread throughout the regional economy.  
To provide more details regarding the distributional effects of GREAT Plan II, we construct an MSM that 
we link to the results from the CGE model for the Georgia economy. For all practical purposes, GREAT 
Plan II has no effect on the distribution of consumption shares by income class. However, the CGE shows 
that the reform would have a substantial negative impact on the growth rates in real personal income 
and real consumption of goods and services. Consequently, we conclude that everyone in Georgia would 
be worse-off after the reform, irrespective of their income class. 
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We would be remiss if we did not point out some of the limitations of the analysis. The industry data are 
aggregated, which masks some of the distortions caused by the tax policy. Production is defined by 
industry and not by product line. This results in a lack of precision in measuring the sales tax base. We do 
not include land as a separate input, which is an important factor in housing. Given that land is immobile, 
the model probably overstates the effect on capital from reducing property taxes. Finally, while the 
assumptions that we make for the dynamics are economically justifiable, we have no way of determining 
whether our specification of the dynamics correspond to reality.  
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